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Page 6 in the original is blank. Introduction 
It is a paerally rec:opUzed faa that amall and medium-lized enterprises form a cornerstone of 
the iDdUitrial and commercial structure of Europe and a major source of ianovation and jobs. 
Indeed, smaller bulineues can and do make a significant contribution towards ttreqtbenins 
the polition of the European economy in a world-wide context, thereby helpiq to improve 
the competitiveneu of European industry and safesuardins employment in Europe. 
At the woe time, it is clear that because of their very nature, anall and medium-sized firms 
are faced  by problems .which are leu relevant for laqer enterprises. For example, smaller 
firma may have handicaps in the field of fin•ncins, and in terms of  m•nqmen~  they may auf-
fer &om inadequate trainiq or information facilities. FilcaJ problems or difficulties relatiq 
to technical and administrative requirements and norms may be felt partiadady acutely by 
analler firma. 
In recopition of the important role of anall and medium-sized enterprises on the one hand 
and the special problems they encounter on the other, it was decided to devote partiadar att-
ention to them at a European level. At the initiative of the European Parliament, promptly 
and wbolebeanedly supported by the European Conunisaion and the Economic and Social 
Committee, 1983 wu declared the year of small and medium-sized enterprises. Duriq the 
c:oune of the year, numerous conferences, seminars and other forma of discuuion were or-
pnizecl in this context tbroushout the EEC. 
It is clear that the all-round position of small and medium-lized enterprises can only be impro-
ved  tbrouah  a multi-policy  approach.  European competition  policy  is one of the several 
7 insttuments that can be used for this purpose and its imponance in this respect is two-fold: by 
helping to maintain or re-establish a genuine competitive structure, competition policy helps 
aeate an environment in which smaller firms can compete as successfully as possible with 
large firms. 
Secondly, the special problems of small and medium-sized enterprises have been taken into 
account whenever possible in the formulation and development of that policy, in an effon to 
further enhance their competitive position. 
Having noted the beneficial repercussions of competition policy for small and medium-sized 
firms, it must immediately be underlined that such firms are at the same time expected to 
respect the rules which make up that policy, just like any others involved in business. Because 
it is difficult to respect a law of which one is not really aware, the question is how generally 
known the European competition rules are. 
Hone looks at the United States, where competition or 'antitrust' laws have been in force for a 
century, one sees a universal awareness of  those laws on the pan of  all businesses, from small 
to large. This respect of the law is especially understandable in view of the fact that violation 
of the antitrust laws can involve very serious punishment. 
Competition law in the European Community is by comparison very new. The EEC Treaty 
which contains the basic competition rules has been with us now for a little over 25 years, and 
the first individual competition cases in which pecuniary sanctions were imposed took place 
not even 15 years ago. Although this case law has developed steadily, many businessmen may 
feel the need to be more fully informed, so that they can recognize a potential competition pro-
blem when they see one. Large undertakings often have at their service specialized lawyers or 
8 other advisers who are trained to spot and deal with such problems. Smaller firma must nor-
mally sort out these matten themselves, without any expert advice. 
With all these considerations in mind, the European Commission decided that it would be 
useful to publish a practical guide to the European competition rules, especially tailored to the 
interest~ of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Competition policy  is  a very technical and complex area of European Community law.  It 
would not be pouible in the context of a concise practical guide to deal with it in exhaustive 
detail. Although this guide endeavoun to give as complete an overview as possible, its main 
purpose is to make small and medium-sized firms aware of the scope of the competition rules, 
hdping them devdop an automatic 'reflex' to take those rules into account in their business 
dealings. 
Particular attention has been paid in this overview to the rules which are of special importance 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, notably where exceptions have been provided in their 
favour. 
Enterprises may wonder whether they should consider themselves to be small or medium-
sized, in other words whether this guide has been written for them. In the competition fidd, 
no attempt has been made to formulate a precise definition of this concept. It derives its mea-
ning from the economic context of each specific field covered by legislative and administrative 
measures applying the competition rules, so that a variety of enterprises fall under the excep-
tions devited for the benefit of smaller firms. 
As a matter of general principle, however, the competition rules are rdevant for  all those 
engaged in economic or commercial activities, regardless of their size. This guide is therefore 
9 claciaed for any undcrcaJdDa wbicb feels it is DOt or not suffidendy familiar with the Euro-
pean competitioll rula;  iD priCCice, it  will probably be espcri111y Ulefullor lllll1l and medium-
sized firms. 
Fiully, European compedtioa law lhould by no mana be ICeD u  limply yet another let of 
ruJa and replatiaal which make life difficult lor uadertakiap. Dyaamic, coalistaat applica-
rioa of  the compeacioa rules is of  pan:icular beaefit to IID&II and medium-tized enterprila iD 
thac it forma a procec:tion apinlt daauctive anti~tive  behaviour, enabq them to 
deYelop u iDdepeadmdy and u viloroualY u  poaible. 
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FrtJIU Alld,.,.,.. 
M.,bfto of th• 
E.uro,.., comm;,;o, I.  What is the EEC 
Definition and aims of  the EEC 
The  European Economic  Community ('EEC')  was  established  in  1957 by  France, Italy, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, for the purpose of creating a union of 
European ltateS, bound together by common economic goals. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and 
the United JCinadom joined and Iince 1981 Greece has been a member. Spain and Portupl 
have also applied for membership. 
By creating a single 'common market' the present 10 Member StateS strive together to achieve 
the harmonious development of economic activities, continuous economic expansion and a 
faster rise in the standard of living. With these goals in mind, the activities of the EEC include 
- the elimination of customs duties between the Member States, 
- the creation of a common commercial policy towards third countries, 
- the creation of common policies in a number of specific secton, such as alriculture and 
transportation, 
- the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital throughout 
the Community, 
- the creation of common funds to promote social and regional development, 
- the approximation, or 'harmonization' as it is often referred to, of national laws, 
- the establishment of a system which ensures that competition is not distorted. 
Although the removal of the various barrien existing between the Member States has by no 
means been completed, undertakinp in the Community can inc:reuinsly reap the benefits of 
operating on one large, unified market reaching more than 250 million citizens . 
• 
•  • 
Next to this general economic community which exists between the Member StateS a common 
market hu also been established in the coal and steel sector ('ECSC', the European Coal and 
Steel Community) and in the field of nuclear energy ('Euratom', the European Atomic Energy 
Community). 
11 The institutions 
The responsibility for achieving the aims of the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom lies with four 
institutions: 
- the European Parliament, which has 434 members, is elected directly by the citizens of the 
Member States. The parliamentarians are not organised in national sections, but in Com-
munity-level political groups. The Parliament must be consulted on the more important 
Commission proposals to the Council and has far-reaching powers in the budgetary field, 
among others the power to reject the Community budget as a whole. Also, the Parliament 
can compel the Commission to resign as a body by passing a motion of censure. 
- the Court of  Justice, composed of 11 judges, assisted by 5 advocates-general, ensures that 
implementation of the Treaties is in accordance with the rule of law. It plays an essential 
role in the interpretation of  European law, frequendy at the request of national courts. The 
Court also deals with disputes on Community matters between Member States, between 
Member States and the Community institutions, or between the latter and individuals, 
including firms. 
In the field of competition policy, the Court has issued important decisions which give 
valuable guidance to undertakings as to the meaning of the competition rules. 
-the  Council  consists of representatives of the governments of the 10 Member States. Al-
though the 'main' representative for each is its Foreign Minister, membenhip of the Coun-
cil varies with the subjects down for discussion. Meetings are thus often attended by the 
Ministers for Agriculture, Transport and so forth. 
Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, any measure of general application or of a certain 
level of  importance must be enacted by the Council, which can, however, only in rare cases 
proceed without a proposal from the Commission. 
- the Commission is a collegiate body consisting of 14 Members, appointed by agreement 
between the member governments. Throughout their four-year term of office, Members 
must remain independent of the governments and of the Council. The Commission has a 
wide range of duties: 
•  it is the guardian of the Treaties; 
•  it is the executive arm of the Communities; 
•  it is the initiator of Community policy and exponent of the Community interest in the 
Council. 
Other community organs include the Economic and Social  Committee, the European 
Investment Bank and the Court of Auditors. 
Legislation in the EEC 
The EEC Treaty mentions four instruments which the competent Community institutions can 
use to establish law or policy: 
- regulations, which are laws directly applicable and binding in the Member States; 
- directives are addressed to Member States. They lay down the results to be achieved, but 
leave the Member States free choose form and methods; 
ll - decisions, which are binding on those to whom they are addressed. This can be a Member 
State, a legal entity or a private person. In the competition field, decisions issued by the 
Commission can have a far-reaching impact on the behaviour of undertakings; 
- r~commendations  and opinions, which have no binding force. 
This list of Community acts is not limitative: use is also made, for example, of communica-
tions, memoranda, guidelines and general programmes. 
In the competition area, the Commission has issued several notices which, although not bin-
ding, can nonetheless be useful for undertakings as general guidance. 
General 
Community law is a factor which all those operating in the common market must be aware of 
and take into account. Not only do the EEC rules - including the rules of competition -
apply, often directly, in all the Member States, but in cases of conflict with national laws, 
Community law prevails. 
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Page 14 in the original is blank. D.  The EEC competition rules which apply to undertakings 
The creation of one linlle common market requires the elimination of ec:onomic burien exi-
ltiq  betweea the Member States, auch u  the removal of a11t0m1 dutiel or other quantitative 
meuura havinaan equivalent effect to auch dutiel. Wherever nationalleplation impeda the 
free movement of, for example, gooda aaou the froatierl of the Member States, it il the 
nationalautboritiel who may come under attack for vio1atiq the Treaty. 
Private arraapmeatl may alao interfere with c:rou-border trade or otbenvile create diviliom 
within the Europeaa market, for example, ap-eementl between campania to keep out of each 
otber"a national nwketl. Here. it il  the campania concerned who may be attacked, UDder the 
competitioa rula. 
The EEC Treaty provida for the atablilbment of a ayacem to eaaure that competitioa in the 
common market il  DOt diltorted. Thil objective of market intelratioa il  u  important u  the 
traditional role which competition playa in free market economiea, IUCh u  eDIUrini efficient 
1S allocation of resources, stimulating enterprises to make the best use of their know-how and 
skills and encouraging them to develop new research techniques and products. 
The rules of competition are contained in Articles 85 to 94 of the EEC Treaty. 
(N.B. The ECSC Treaty imposes special competition rules on undertakings operating in the 
coal or steel industry. Special rules also apply in the agriculture and transport sectors and in 
the nuclear energy field. This guide does not deal with these sectors) . 
• 
•  • 
Articles 85 and 86 relate to anticompetitive behaviour by enterprises which has an effect on 
trade between Member States. These are the rules which undertakings must be aware of and 
must comply with in all their commercial dealings. 
Both Articles are aimed at avoiding abuses of  economic power: Article 85 is directed at abuses 
which occur through the activities of (competing) enterprises, whereas Article 86 is aimed at 
abusive behaviour by monopolies or firms with very considerable power. 
Competition can of course also be distorted when national governments favour certain under-
takings, by granting them aids in whatever form, such as outright grants or special tax advan-
tages. This aspect of  competition policy, which is dealt with in Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty, 
is of  indirect importance to enterprises in the sense that if the Commission finds a certain state 
aid to be illegal, it will intervene against the national government concerned and not against 
the company to whom the aid is given. However, in view of the fact that companies might be 
obliged to reimburse any aids illegally received, it is obviously also of direct relevance for 
them. This topic is dealt with in Chapter V. 
Article 85 
Basic principle- the prohibition of Article 85(1) 
Article 85 of  the Treaty relates to anticompetitive behaviour by two or more undertakings and 
prohibits agreements or other practices which distort competition and which are liable to 
affect trade between Member States. Examples of such prohibited activities are price fixing 
between competitors, agreements on market shares or production quotas, or tie-in clauses. 
The prohibition of  Article 85 applies both to so-called horizontal agreements, meaning agree-
ments between undertakings at the same level of  commercial activity, in other words between 
competitors, and to vertical agreements, such as agreements between manufacturers and the 
distributors of their goods. 
16 The following checklist can be used in considering whethet a particular commercial activity 
will be caught by the prohibition of Article 85 paragraph 1: 
(1) thete must be an agreement (in writing or oral), or a decision by an association of under-
takings (for example a trade association) or a so-called concerted practice, which covers 
positive  action  falling  short of an actual  agreement  to align  undertakings'  activities 
(hereinafter, the term 'agreement' will be used to cover all three types of activities). 
(2) thete must be more than one undertaking involved; the term 'undertaking' must be viewed 
in the broadest sense, covering any entity engaged in economic or commercial activities 
such as production, distribution or the supply of services and ranging from small shops 
run by one individual to large industrial companies. 
(3) thete must be a  noticeable restraint upon competition involved; this applies not only 
whete the actual object, but also where the effect is such a restraint. 
(4) the agreement must have a perceptible effect, actual or potential, on trade between Mem-
ber States; agreements which have no effect on trade at all, for example agreements rela-
ting to warning labels on dangerous products, and agreements which have an impact only 
on the internal trade within one Membet State or on trade outside the EEC will not be 
caught. Caveat: the fact that all the parries to an agreement are located in one Member 
State and operate only on that market does not necessarily mean that there is no effect on 
interstate trade: if, due to the agreement, that Member State is sealed off from imports 
coming from other Member States, there is an effect on trade. 
Consequences - Article 85(2) 
If an agreement meets the above criteria, therefore falling within the prohibition of Article 
85(1), the following consequences apply: 
- it is null and void from the outset. 
An agreement can De declared void, and thus unenforceable by a national court, if  the par-
ties are involved in a lawsuit about the agreement. Also the Commission can order parries 
to put an end to such a prohibited agreement. 
- the Commission has the power to order the parties to terminate the illegal conduct and it 
may impose fines of up to 1 million ECU ('European Currency Unit', a fluctuating curren-
cy, equal, on 10 October 1983, toBFR/LFR45.92(conv.) or46.79 (fin.), DKR 8.16, DR 
80.50, DM 2.25, HFL 2.53, UKL 0.58, FF 6.91, LIT 1 371.91, IRL 0.72) or even more, 
up to 10% of the annual turnover of the undertakings concerned. Fines are paid into the 
Commission's budget, not to any parries injured by the anticompetitive behaviour; these 
may, however, seek damages in national courts. 
Exemptions- Article 85(3) 
The general rule as described above, is that restrictive practices which affect intetstate trade 
are not allowed, and undertakings engaged in such activities will be ordeted to stop doing so 
and run the risk of being fined by the Commission. 
However, an important nuance has been added to this general rule: the prohibition of Article 
85 can be declared inapplicable by the Commission (and not by national courts) if the harmful 
17 effects of a restrictive agreement or practice are sufficiendy counterbalanced by a number of 
beneficial elements. Paragraph 3 of  Article 85 lists four conditions which must all be met be-
fore such a so-called 'exemption' can be granted by the CoiDIIlission: 
(  1) the agreement muat contribute to an improvement in production or distribution, or econo-
mic: propeu. In other words, there must be clear objective advantages involved, such as a 
reduction of  costa or an increase of production capacity; 
(2) a fair share of the resulting benefits must be allowed to consumers (and this includes not 
only ultimate consumers but also trade purchasers), for example in the form of lower 
pric:a or an improvement in the quality of the goods or services concerned; 
(3) only restrictions of competition which are indispensible in order to achieve the beneficial 
results will be allowed; 
(  4) competition in respect of the goods or services in question may never be eliminated sub-
stantially altopther. 
Where an agreement meets these four requirements, an exemption can be granted, either on 
an individual basis or by way of a group exemption: 
- for the Commission to be able to grant an exemption in an individual case, the parties must 
normally fint have notified their agreement, to the Commission, on a special form. Chap-
ter IV deals with this procedure in greater detail. One important consequence of notifica-
tion should be noted: as a general rule, no fines may be imposed for the period from the 
moment of notification until the Commission reaches a decision; 
- agreements need not be notified and nonetheless benefit from exemption if  they fulfill the 
requirements contained in so-called 'group exemption' regulations which exist with respect 
to certain categories of agreements. At present, group exemptions are in force with respect 
to the following types of agreements:  ' 
•  specialization agreements, 
•  exclusive distribution agreements, 
•  exclusive purchasing agreements. 
Furthermore, group exemptions are envisaged for: 
- patent licensina agreements, 
- research and development agreements, 
- distribution agreements in the automobile sector. 
Group exemptions are of particular importance to small and medium-sized firms, because: 
(1) no notification to the Commission is required, an advantage for small firms who may not 
have the nec:euary manpower or expertise to deal with the notification procedure; 
(2) they give absolute legal certainty: by staying in line with the conditions contained in the 
group exemption, undertakings can be  assured that their agreements will  not later be 
declared void, nor will they be liable for fines; 
(3) the Commission has taken specific account of small and medium-sized firms in setting up 
its group exemptions. 
These group exemptions are dealt with in more detail in connection with the specific types of 
apeanents concerned. 
18 Article 86 
Article as relates to restric:tive practic:ea between undertakinp; u  loaa u  there is an appreci-
able ratraint upoo competition and an effect on intentate trade,IUCh qreaneotl are prohib-
ited, reprd1eu of the lize of the undertakinp c:oncemed. 
Article 86 is clireaed at a differeat problem, namely the behaviour of undertakinp whic:b are 
iD a dnmiDant poeitioo. Havinl a dominant polition is DOt iD itself prohibited. Ualike 85, 
which is buecl on a paeral princ:i.ple of prohibition, Article 86 only attacb the abute of a 
dominant polition, when an effect on intentate trade is involved. 
The elements oecaaary for application of Article 86 are: 
(  1) There muat be uadertaking in a dominant position. Althouab ""''lut '""'• is the major 
clement in a1aatina dominance, it is by DO meao~  the only factor. An undertalciag can be 
deemed to be dominant if, becauae of vtrioua £acton, such u  ready aa:eu to raw mate-
rials or capital, it hal the power to act indepeadendy, without haviq  terioualy to take into 
account ita competiton, purcbaaen or aupplien. 
(2) The dominant  poaition  mUit  be  in  the  COIDIDOil  market or a aubltantial  part of it; 
whether a parciaa~Jr pographic area - for example a portion of a Member State - can 
be deemed to be a 'aubttantial part' dependa on a llUIDber of £acton, includiq the aacurc 
of the product market involved, In one cate, the IOUthem part of Germany wu  held to be 
'tubaantial' iD tbil context; iD another cate, BelPum. 
(3) There mUit be an abuu of the dominant polition, in the ICDIC that aclvantqe is taken of 
the dominant poaition which cauaa injury to third parties. Examples are: 
- cJwsinl uafair purchue or Nl1in& prices: prices which are uafairly hiP beiDa to the 
detriment of CIODIUillerl, UDfairly low (below COlt) prices beiDa aimed at eliminaq 
weaker competiton who do DOt have the power to match tbae low prices for any 
Jeaatb of time; 
- dilc:riminatory pricel, e.s. cbarsinl CUitOillel' A more than cultOIDer B for exactly the 
ume trtuaction, thereby placing 'A' at a competitive diudvantap; 
19 - refusal to sell to a customer without valid, objective reasons; 
-attempts to hold on to customers, for example by granting fidelity rebates. 
Given the nature of dominance, it is safe to say that it is difficult to envisage Article 86 ever 
being applied to individual small and medium-sized enterprises; and, although joint domin-
ance by serveral undertakings is not to be excluded, it would take a large number of  small and 
medium-sized firms acting in concert to achieve the necessary economic power. 
Article 86 is nevertheless of great indirect and indeed favourable importance to small and 
medium-sized firms, who may depend for their growth or  even their very survival on the beha-
viour of undertakinp in a dominant position. In this sense, small and medium-sized firms can 
benefit from ac:tions by virtue of Article 86 to prevent abusive practices by dominant firms. As 
in the case of Article 85, victims can invoke Article 86 directly before national courts in order 
to put an end to the abusive behaviour. Also, complaints can be made to the Commission; this 
procedure is described in Chapter IV. 
Activities which do not run foul of  the competition rules 
The administrative practice of  the Commission provides for a procedure enabling parties to an 
agreement to seek a declaration from the Commission that their activities do not come within 
the scope of the competition rules and are therefore 'safe'. 
Such 'neptive clearances', as these declarations are called, can be given in individual cases, 
provided the parties have notified their agreement to the Commission; this procedure is dealt 
with in Chapter IV. 
20 Furthermore, a number of 'block' negative clearances exist for certain activities which either 
because of  (1) the size of the undertakings involved, (2) the relationship between those under-
takings or (3) the nature of the activity are not deemed to be an infringement of the competi-
tion rules. For certain of these activities, the Commission has issued a number of notices to 
provide some guidance to businessmen as to what course of action they can punue without 
getting into trouble with the competition rules. 
When doubt remains as to whether an agreement falls within one of the following categories, 
parties can of course apply for individual negative clearance. 
Agreements of minor importance (the 'de minimis rule') 
Small and medium-sized firms should be aware of the faa that many of the agreements they 
conclude will not be considered to violate the competition rules because the economic effect 
involved is not significant enough. This can be measured by market share and turnover. 
As a guideline, the Commission has issued a notice ('Notice concerning agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices of minor importance which do not fall  under Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC') indicating that normally agreements will not be caught by Artic-
le 85(1) if  two conditions are met: 
(1) marltn shar6: the products which are the subject of the agreement and other products of 
the participating undertakings considered by consumers to be similar by reason of their 
characteristics, price or use (broadly speaking, competing or substitute products), must 
not represent, in a substantial part of  the common market, more than 5% of the total mar-
ket for such products, and 
(2) tumov6r: the aggregate annual turnover of  the participating undertakings must not exceed 
SO million ECU. 
Such so-called 'de minimis' agreements are normally safe, even though they involve certain 
restrictions. A caveat must be added: the criteria indicated by the Commission are by way of 
guidance only. 
Relations between undertakings which bar application of the competition rules 
Commercial agents 
The Commission has made it clear ('Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial 
agents') that a contract made with a commercial agent who transacts business on behalf of the 
principal does not fall under Article 85(1). A trader will only be considered to be a 'commer-
cial agent' if  he does not bear any responsibility for the financial risks involved in the business 
transactions (except for the normal del cr6d6r6 guarantee, by which the agent undertakes to 
indemnify the principal against failures to pay by customers) and is in faa no more than a 
mere intermediary of the principal. The name given to the representative is not decisive in 
determining whether he is a commercial agent or an independent trader, it is a matter of the 
factual relation between the parties. 
21 For example, where a cliatributor 
- maintains a c:onaiderable stock of the aooda in question as his own propeny, or 
- proviclelat his own expelliC substantial &ee customer-service, or 
- determines the prices at whidl he sells or other terms of business, 
he will be deemed to be an independent trader, and not a commercial agent, and the rules of 
competition must be taken into ac:count. 
Parmt compa,i6s/  subsidiari•s 
Article 85(1) can only apply where competition exists between undertakinp which is capable 
of beins restricted. Agreements between parent companies and their subsidiaries, or between 
aublidiariel amonpt thCmaelvea, in other words undertakinp forming one economic unit, 
will not be cauaht by Article 85(1), where 
- the subsidiary does not have any real freedom to determine its course of action on the mar-
ket; one criterion here is how large the parent company's shareholdina is; 
- the apeemcnt relates merely to the allocation of tub  within the concern. 
ActMtiea which by their nature are not anti-competitive 
The Commiuion has stated, again by way of notices, that certain forms of cooperation bet-
ween undertakinp and certain types of subcontractin& agreements do not pose any problem 
under the competition rules. The size of the undertakinp involved is generally not relevant in 
this context. 
In its 'Notice conc:erning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field of coopera-
tion between enterprises', the Commillion indicates that eighteen types of agreements are 
deemed not to restrict competition where their object is one of the following forms of coopera-
tion: 
- an excbaqe of opinion or experience; 
- joint comparative studies of enterprises or industries; 
- joint preparation of statiltia and calculation models; 
- joint market research; 
- cooperation in ac:counting matters; 
- joint provision of credit guarantees; 
- joint debt-collecting auociationa; 
- joint bulineu or tax consultant agencies; 
- joint implementation of research and development contracts; 
- joint implementation of research and development projects; 
22 - joint placing of research and development contracts; 
- sharinJ out of research and development projects, among participating enterpriaes; 
- joint use of production, storage and transpon equipment; 
-joint  execution of orden (but only when the participants do not compete with each other 
as regards the work to be done); 
- joint selling anangemenu by non-competing firms; 
- joint after-sales and repairs len'ices when the participants are non-competing firms, or, 
even if  they are competitors, when these services are provided by an undenaking indepen-
dent of them; 
- joint adveniling (but no restriction is allowed on the participants also to advenise inde-
pendendy); 
- joint quality marks (but only where the label is available to all competitors on the same 
conditions). 
Subcontracting 
A subcontracting agreement is a form of work distribution whereby one firm - the subcon-
tractor-supplies goods, work or services for another firm- the contractor-in accordance 
with the latter's specifications; this distinguishes it from an ordinary sale of  goods or supply of 
services. 
23 While subcontracting il done by  undertalcings of all  sizes,  small  and medium-sized firms 
account for the major part of it. It is indeed a form of business cooperation which is particu-
larly favourable for the development of such firms:  whereas the contractor may have the 
financial and tedmical resources enabling him to manufacture a complete product, the sub-
contractOr in hit turn will be able to improve his facilities, expand his know-how and cut his 
costs in hit particular field of activity. 
In the relevant notice ('Commission notice of 18 December 1978 concerning its assessment of 
certain subcontracting ap-eements in relation to Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty'), the Com-
mission indicates that subcontracting ap-eements are not of themselves caught by the prohibi-
tion of Article 85(1). 
However, in order to carry out the order, the subcontractOr may have to make use of  particu-
lar technology or equipment provided by the contractor. In order to protect the economic 
value of such equipment or technology, the contractor may wish to restrict their use by the 
subcontractor to whatever is necessary for the purpose of the agreement. In this way, the sub-
contractor may become dependent on the contractor, and thereby be limited in his freedom of 
business action. 
Thil applies particularly to the obligation imposed on the subcontractor to supply the items 
covered by the subcontract solely to the contractor, an obligation of material importance 
where the subcontract il  for the manufacture of spare parts and of adaptable or compatible 
components which the subcontractor could also sell otherwise than to the contractor. 
The Notice indicates that provision of the contractor's technology or equipment to the sub-
contractor may justify the obligation to supply solely to the contractor the items manufactu-
red or the work done with the help of the technology or equipment. These conditions are ful-
filled not only when the technology or equipment is protected by the contractor's industrial 
property rights or rights over secret know-how but also when it can be used to manufacture a 
distinctive product or to supply a service which is not available from other undertakings in the 
same industry.  Otherwise, the subcontractor must remain free  to meet orders from other 
customers. 
Other clauses covering the use of facilities provided under subcontracting agreements will 
likewise be judged by the need to protect the contribution actually made by the contractor to 
the performance of  the order and at the same time to safeguard the subcontractor's freedom to 
enpge in other activities. For instance, by reason of the special nature of  these agreements the 
use of know-how supplied by the contractor to the subcontractor may be justifiably confined 
to the apecific order. On the other hand, the subcontracting relationship does not justify reser-
ving solely for the contractor the results of the subcontractor's research and development 
work, where they can be applied to other purposes. 
24 m.  How the competition rules affect agreements -and other 
business dNiings of undertakings 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a pneral discription was given of the meaning of  Article 85 (  1) of the 
EEC Treaty with regard to restrictive ap-eements, concerted prac:tic:a or decisions of auocia-
tiona of undertakinp. 
Havina thus establiahed the principles involved in the application of this Article, we now tum 
to its relevance with respect to spedfic types of agreements. 
Article  8S  itlellliau by way of example several types of agreements which may prevent, 
restrict or distort competition. 
For the sake of clarity, we will make a distinction between horizontal qreements, that is 
qreements between competitors or potential competitors, and vertical qreements, that is 
apeeements between undertakinp in different stages of the process through which a product 
or service passes &om the manufacturer to the liaaJ comumer. 
The 'cle minimia rule' 
AI indicated above in Chapter n, agreements which because of  the market share and the tum· 
over of the undertakinp involved are deemed to have a neslilible effect on competition and 
intentate uade poae no problems under the competition rules. 
This so-called 'de minimis rule' which applies to such ap-eements is particularly relevant for 
amalJ and medium-sized enterprises, because the agreements they conclude will o&en fulfil the 
criteria as to market share and turnover laid down in the Notice concerning agreements of 
minor importance. 
Whatever the nature of  the agreement in question, if  the two criteria are applicable, the under-
takinp conc:erned normally need not worry about the pouible applicability of Article 85( 1) 
and can therefore refrain &om notifying to the Commiuion. 
In border-line cues, of  course, undertakinp are well-advised to consider whether their agree-
ment falls under any of the headinp indicated below. 
25 Horizontal agr~ements 
Horizontal ~~~  which pose no problcmJ under the competition rules 
WbeD UDdertakiop have establiabed that a particular qreement does not satisfy the 'de mini-
mil rule', the next 1tep ia to check whether the agreement is one which by its nature ia not 
cleemed to pate a problem under Article 85(1). 
For this purpose, the Notices on, respectively, coopnatiolf agr•.,.,.ts and  subco~ttracti~tg  a,_,..,.,. offer guidance. Thae are dealt with above in Chapter n. 
Horizoatal.qrcemcaa which benefit &om a group exemption 
Certain horizontal apeements, namely apecialization agreements, are exempted as a group 
under Article 85(3). Thia meaaa that although Article 85(1) ia normally applicable (apin, the 
'de minimiJ rule' mutt fint be considered), agreements which fall  under the aiteria of the 
group exemption iuued by the Commiuion are deemed  to meet the requirements of ex-
emption under Article 85(3) without the need of  prior notification. 
For the purpote of the group exemption, apecialization agreements are agreements by which 
partiel undertake a reciprocal obligation: 
- either not to manufacture certain products tbemaelves and leave to the other aide the task 
of manufacturia& thoae products, or 
- to only manufacture certain products joindy. 
By sivinl up the manufacture of certain products the partic:i.patins undertakinp can each con-
centrate-or, in other worda, 'apec:ialize in'-the manufacture of thoae products remaining 
in their reapective production linea. Competition ia reatric:ted becauae the partiea pve up the 
pouibility of independendy manufac:turing certain itemS. 
The group exemption wu  aeated in order to allow anall and medium-aized firma to improve 
their production proc:euea and thereby atrcngthen their competitive polition 1/is-Q-1/is larger 
firms. 
In order to fall under the group exemption, apecialization agreements must fulfil the following 
conditiona: 
(1) The agreement mutt be between unall and medium-lized undertakinp, measured on the 
basil of  market abare and turnover, in this caae: 
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- the market abare with reapect to the specialized products may not exceed in a aubstan-
tial part of the common market, 15% of the market for all such products; 
- the total annual turnOver of  the participating undertakinp must not exceed 300 million 
ECU. 
The pup  exemption is balically aimed at individual anall and medium-sized firms: if  a 
amall firm ia in fact part of a lqer  concern, the market share and turnover of the whole coocem must be taken into &alOUilt, widl the result that the thtabolda  would probably be 
exceedec:l mel the exemption thus inapplicable. 
(2) The commitment to epecia1ize must be reciprocal, which means that an obliption on only 
one of  the parties to refrain &om production of  a c:ertain item would not qualify for pup 
exemption. 
(3) The commianent must refer only to the nature of the producta, 10 that any quantitative 
limitation of production does not fall within the pup  exempdon. 
(4) Certain aclditional daUICI may be qreed wbic:h are euential to implement the commit-
ment to specialize: 
- a non-c:ompetitio daUIC; 
-exclusive purchains mel cliatribution commitments with respect to the specialized pro-
ducts, in order to enable the partic::ipanta to continue dealina in the whole ranae of  pro-
ducts; 
- obliptions conc:emins minimum stocks, replacement pans, mel CUitomen and after-
ula  aervicea. 
(5) Commitments widl regard  to prieu are not allowed in the context of the pup ex-
emption. 
R.uarch and dwelo,.,.t 
A lfOUP exemption is beiDa prepared reprdina mearc:h and development; proviaiolll whic:h 
are particularly favourable for anall and medium-sizecl enterpriles are envisaged. This legisla-
tion will probably 10 into eHect at the end of 1984. 
Horizoatal-arecmcata which are not allowed 
A•nminl the 'de minimi•  rule',  the  Noticel on cooperation mel aubc:ontractina  and the 
apeci•liution block exemption are all not applicable in a particular case, (c:ompetina) under-
takinp must refrain &om en1aain1 in the followin& activities: 
- Priu fixirtg (ot/Nr tradirtg corulitiom). - Prohibited are all qreements, directly or indi-
rectly fixin& buyina and/  or tellin& prices. The term 'indirectly' mven the lituation where 
unclertakiDp apee in pneral u  to their pric:ins policies. Al10 prohibited are any &pee-
menta by which undertaldnp restrict themaelves u  to the tradin& coaditiona they apply in 
their buainesa dealinp, suc:h as on what basil dilc:ounts are granted, credit terml, etc. 
- Marlut or prodtu:tionshari1fl. - Apoeements between (potential) c:ompetiton to keep out 
of  each othen markets or to allocate certain territories or aoun::a of mpply amonpt them-
telves are prohibited. Arraapmenu to c:ontrol procluction itself IUCh as limitations impo-
aed by quotaa, u  well ulons  term plans reprd.ins production are normally not allowed. 
- ~~~  to dilcriminau.  - Agreements between undertalcinp to fix clilc:riminatory 
term1 in their cle•linp widl third parties who are in mmpetition widl each other are not 
allowed. For example when A mel B apee to apply more advantapoua c:onditiona to buyer 
C than to buyer D, for transactions which are the same, buyer D will be placed at a c:ompe-
27 titive disadvantage. It should be noted that this type of behaviour is only prohibited where 
there is an agreement between A and B to discriminate; in the absence of a dominant posi-
tion, A,  acting individually, is as a general rule free  to apply the terms he wants in his 
various business dealings. 
- Colkctiv6 boycotts. - Agreements between undertakings aimed at forcing a (potential) 
competitor out of the market or preventing market entry by others are not allowed. 
- Ti6-ins.  - Agreements are not allowed by which undertakings impose 'tying arrange-
ments', for example obliging a buyer of  one produa or service to also buy another produa 
or service which is not conneaed to the first by its nature of commercial usage. 
This list of prohibited agreements is not exhaustive, but illustrates the types of agreements 
which have restriaive effects on competition. 
Horizontal agreements which may pose problems 
AJain, assuming the 'de minimis rule' does not apply, certain agreements may possibly violate 
Article 85(1): 
- Joint purchasing agreements between competitors and even between non-competing firms 
may lead to a restriaion on competition, for example by making it more difficult for supp-
liers to make individual sales to the participants in the joint purchasing arrangements. Joint 
purchasing agreements between small firms can be encouraged so as to place them in a bet-
ter competitive position vis-a-vis powerful purchasing concerns. However, the purchasing 
power which is created when firms participate in joint purchasing can not be allowed to 
assume such proportions which would lead to an abuse of that purchasing power vis-a-vis 
suppliers. 
- Joint selling agreements which limit the freedom of the parties to fix their selling prices or 
otherwise to sell as they see fit will normally infringe Article 85(1). Such selling arrange-
ments can for example be organized in the context of  a trade association or through joindy 
owned marketing subsidiaries. 
Joint selling arrangements between non-competing firms (aaual or potential) will normally 
not be held to violate Article 85(1), nor is it likely that joint selling to countries outside the 
EEC will be deemed to be an infringement provided trade between Member States is not 
affected. 
- Saks promotion. - Three types of  sales promotion may be relevant under the competition 
rules: trade fairs, joint advertising and the use of a common quality control label. 
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•  Trade associations which organize trad6 fairs  may impose certain restriaions on the 
members as to their participation in other trade fairs than those organized by the asso-
ciation. These restriaions may be anticompetitive at two levels, in that they limit the 
possibilities of other organizers of trade fairs to acquire participants and furthermore 
limit the freedom of participating producers to promote their goods elsewhere. Certain 
restriaions may, however, be exemptable because of the advantages which result from 
an orderly organization of trade fairs. •  Joint ad11ertising may be used to promote the products of  a particular industry or a com-
mon brand. Such joint publicity normally poses no problems, as long as the participants 
remain free to also promote their products independendy. 
•  The use of a common quality label or trademark in joint promotional activities is  al-
lowed when use of the label is open to all manufacturers whose products meet the rele-
vant quality standards. If  further restrictions are involved, such as an obligation on the 
participants not to manufacture other products not covered by the common label, the 
agreement may pose problems under Article 85(1). 
- Exchange of information.  - Undertakings may arrange to exchange information, for 
example through a central agency, on quantities, prices, discounts and other terms of busi-
ness,  or on suppliers  and customers.  Such  exchange  of information  can  lead  to an 
alipment of the participants' business conduct. 
The legality of  such information arrangements will depend on, in the first place, the type of 
information involved: exchange of purely statistical information, for example on produc-
tion and sales figures for a particular industry, without identifying the individual firms 
concerned, is not objectionable. 
In general, information arrangements become dangerous &om the competition point of 
view where they are likely to lead to collusion: cooperation which jeopardizes the indepen-
dent determination of business policies by the participants must be avoided. 
- Trade associations/market foreclosure.- Undertakings in a particular sector may validly 
pursue common interests by aeating a trade association. Among the possible problems 
which must be considered in this context are: 
29 •  activities within the trade association which tend to deprive members of  their freedom to 
determine their individual bulineu policies are dangerous; 
•  where all or nearly all of  the undertakings in a given sector are organized in such an asso-
ciation, market foreclosure vi.r-4-vi.r potential competitors who want to enter that mar-
ket may give rile to problems under the competition rules. 
- No11-compelilioN  cla~UG iN  corrMCiio"  with the sak of  aN  urukrtalt.iNg.  - When the 
ownership of an undertaking changes hands, the new owner (the purchaser) will normally 
want to be protected from competition by the previous owner (the seller), who may at least 
initially be in a ltroJJF competitive position due to his knowledge of the market, etc. 
Agreements relating to the sale of undertakings therefore o&en contain so-called non-com-
petition clauses, obliPnl the seller to refrain from competing in the market in question. 
Whether such a clause is a forbidden restriction of competition depends on a number of 
factors: 
•  H the sale involves merely the transfer of material assets, a non-competition clause is 
normally not neceuary and therefore in violation of Article 85(1). 
•  H the sale involves the transfn of  good-will aNllt.Now-how. protection from competi-
tion by the seller will normally be acceptable under Article 85( 1  ), under two conditions: 
(  1) the duratioN of  the clause must not exceed the period required for an active, competi-
tive purcbuer to build up his position to equal that of the previou1 owner's at the 
time of the transfer. How Ions this period is depends on the specific facts of each 
case; 
(2) the scop• of the clause may not be exceuively wide; the obligation not to compete 
must be limited to the market in which the undertaking was active before its sale. 
Vertical agreements 
The horizontal agreements dealt with in the previous chapter involve situations in which com-
petition il  diminished due to arransements by competitors restricting their independent busi-
neu behaviour. 
V  ertic:al agreements relate to the pauage of  a product from the factory to the end-user. In the 
EEC, such qreements are partic:ularly relevant to the concept of the creation of  one European 
market, in that distribution arransements across the borden can promote market unification. 
In this chapter, the problem of  distribution will be dealt with in the context of  Article 85( 1  ), in 
other words only lituations in which qreements have been concluded relating to distribution 
will be CODiidered. For the application of  Article 86 (abuse of a dominant position) no distinc-
tion need be made between horizontal and vertical activities; the same concepts apply regard-
leas of whether a dominant firm abuses its position llil-4-llis its competitors (horizontal) or in 
the diltribution of its products (vertical). 
30 Whether or not vertical agreements come under Article 85(1) depends on the extent to which 
the parties, i.e. the supplier and hia intermediary/distributor, agree to restrict their commer-
cial freedom. The following concepts are relevant with respect to distribution asreemenu: 
- 'simpl.' distributio11 agr•.,mts: where neither the supplier nor the distributor is bound to 
any  ratrictive obliptiont, auch  as  exclusivity  of purchase  and/or supply,  territorial 
reatrictiont, non-competition clauaes, or minimum purchase requirements, the agreement 
will not fall within the scope of Article 85(1); 
- •xciJUi11• distributio11  agr•mr•t~ts: the supplier ap-ees to supply only one distributor in a 
determined territory. Here, Article 85(1) is relevant: there is a restriction on competition in 
that the supplier is no looser &ee to supply other distributon or, in some cases, even end 
uaen directly, in that territory. In return for the exclusivity, the exclusive distributor may 
in turn aa:ept certain reatrictiont, for example he may agree not also to act as the distribu-
tor for the supplier's competitors; 
- •xclJUW. purciNuit~g agr•.,.,.ts: the distributor agrees to purchase all of his requirements 
of a panU:ular product only &om one supplier.  The distributor is thus restricted in hia 
source of supply and other supplien of the same type of goods have lost a sales oudet; 
- s•kefiw distributio11:  a supplier may wish to limit the sale of hia products to only those 
sales oudeu that meet certain standards. For example, in the case of highly technical pro-
ducu, the aupplier may require that all  dealers polleiS a minimum  degree of technical 
knowledp. 
In the following sections, the applicability of Article 85{1) and the possibilities of exemption 
are considered. 
Disaibution apeementl which pose no problems under Article 85(1) 
{1) For application of Article 85(1), there must be an agreement between independent under-
takinp. Thus, the following cases do not fall under the prohibition: 
- distribution by the manufacturer himaelf; 
- distribution throgp a branch office in a given territory; althogp a position of exclusiv-
ity is present, the branch is seen as part of the manufacturer himaelf; 
- likewise, true qency agreements, where the commercial agent is merely an auxiliary of 
the aupplier, do not fall under Article 85( 1) - see Chapter ll; 
- and, where a local subsidiary company is entrutted with the distribution of the supp-
lier's goods, Article 85( 1) will not apply if  that subsidiary has no autonomous commer-
cial freedom. See Chapter ll. 
(2) The u mi11imis rul. (see Chapter ll,) also applies to vertical arrangements. 
However, a caveat must be added: the underlying principle of the 'de minimis rule' is, that 
for Article 85( 1) to apply, the reatriction on intentate trade and of competition must be 
appreciable. U a aupplier concludes only one distribution ap-eement with a particular 
distributor, there will normally be no problem if  the aiteria u  to market share and tum-
over are fulfilled. However, if  that supplier has set up a vast network of aareemenu with a 
larp number of diatributon, the whole effect of that netWork may be relevant, and not 
just the individual agreements between the supplier and each distributor. 
31 Exclusive distribution asrccmenh: the 'old' group exemption (Repalation 67/67) 
C.Mral 
Although exclusive distribution agreements as described above have detrimental effects as far 
u  competition as conc:emed, such asreements may at the same time be beneficial, not only by 
improving the efficiency of  dittribution but, in general, by contributing to market unification. 
For example, contacts with one (exclusive) distributor only in a particular area may malce it 
ealier for a supplier entering a new market to deal with linpistic and legal differences. 
In practice, many exclusive distribution agreements have been found to fulfill the conditions 
for exemption under Article 85(3) (see Chapter U). Therefore, to avoid having to deal with all 
such c:asea individually, the Commiuion in 1967 put into effect a group exemption (referred 
to aallegulation 67/67) for certain distribution asreements. 
The underlyins principle of the group exemption ia, that while certain reatrictions will be al-
lowed in the intereat of improving distribution, thoae reatrictions may not go too far, and 
must notably never reault in absolute market insulation. In this context, the concept of  paral-
lel imports is very important. 'Parallel imports' exist where in addition to the 'official' route by 
which the goods are imported by the exclusive distributor into a given territory, there is also a 
seamd 'parallel' route, by which another trader in the territory imports the goods, which he 
has obtained &om a third party outside the territory. In other words, that 'parallel importer' is 
a aource of competition for the exclusive distributor. Any attempts to hinder such parallel 
imports render the group exemption inapplicable. 
Sp~eific provisions 
The exemption may apply (i) where A (the supplier) agreea with B (the reaeller or distributor) 
to supply only to B certain goods for reaale within a defined area in the common market, or 
(ii) B (the reseller) agrees with A (the supplier) to purchaae only from A certain goods for re-
aale or (iii) A agrees to supply exclusively to B and at the same time B agreea to purchaae exclu-
sively &om A. 
The main conditions of the group exemption are: 
(1) the agreement must involve two partiea only, theae need not necessarily be eatablished 
within the common market; 
(2) the products must be supplied for reaale, thus for example the exemption does not apply 
when the distributor uaes the products to manufacture another end-product; 
(3) the aalea area must be a defined part of the common market; 
(  4) the only permitted reatriction on the aupplier is the obligation not to sell to other reaellers 
in the aaJea area allocated to the exclusive distributor; 
(S) the supplier can definitely not be obliged to guarantee absolute territorial protection for 
the distributor, for example by barring parallel imports into the salea area; 
(6) the supplier can however agree not to malce direct salea himaelf to customen within the 
distributor's territory; 
32 (7) the cliatributor may agree to purchaae all his requirements &om the supplier. Aside &om 
this, the following obligations on the distributor are also permitted under the group ex-
emption: 
- not to manufacture or sell competing goods; 
- to conc:elltrate his sales effom in his sales territory; this means that he can be obliged to 
re&ain from actively aeeking customers elsewhere. He must, however, always remain 
free to sell outside his sales territory, even in areas allocated by the same supplier to 
oth•r excluaive distributors; 
- to purchase minimum quantities; 
- to sell under the trademark, etc. indicated by the supplier; 
-to  carry out after-sales service. 
No restrictions may be imposed on the distributor as to his prices and other terms of re-
sale, such as the choice of his customers; where theae exist, the benefit of the group ex-
emption is lost; 
(8) the qreement must not be one in which competing manufacturers grant each other exclu-
aive selling rights; this could lead to (horizontal) market sharing; 
(9) there must be no effon by the parties to aeate absolute territorial protection for the distri-
butor, including the improper use of a patent or trademark for that purpose. In other 
words, parallel impom of the contract goods must remain posaible. 
Agreements which satisfy theae conditions are automatically exempted, without the need for 
the parties to notify the agreement to the Commillion; the Commillion does, however, retain 
the npt  to withdraw the benefit of the group exemption in cenain cases, for example if the 
distributor is abusing the exemption by charging unreasonably hiP prices. 
Agreements which contain restrictions going beyond the conditions of the group exemption 
can, of courae, be notified to the Commission in order to obtain an individual exemption. 
33 The new aroup exemptions in effect since 1 July 1983 
(Rcplatioaat983/83 and 1984/83} 
The group exemption described above expired on 1 July 1983 and was replaced by two new 
regulations,  one  c:overinJ  exclusive  distribution agreements  and the other exclusive  pur-
cbuiq agreements. 
Due to the transitional period provided, the situation as  it existed will,  however, remain 
unchaqed until1 January 1987 for agreements which c:omplied with all the terms of  the 'old' 
group exemption and which were in effect before 1 January 1984. 
For 'new' agreements, the situation will be as follows: 
E.xclusivtt distribution agrttmattnts (Rttgulation 1983/83) 
The conditions for group exemption of exclusive distribution agreements, including agree-
ments in which parties enter into exclusive supply and purchasing obligations, will to a large 
extent remain the same as in the past. 
The two most important changes are: 
(  1) the distributor's sales area may now cover the entire territory of the common market; 
(2) the  rule  on exclusive  distribution  ap-eements  between  competing  manufacturers has 
become stricter: such agreements are now always prohibited between large undertakings. 
An exception to this prohibition has, however, been made where one (or both) of the par-
ties is a small or medium-sized enterprise, which for this purpose is defined as having a 
total annual turnover of  less than 100 million ECU. In those cases, non-reciprocal distri-
bution agreements are allowed, that is, one of the parties entrusts the distribution of his 
goods to the other, but not also vice-vena. 
N. B.: The provision has been included for the benefit of 'true' small and medium-sized 
firms; where such firms are in fact part of a larger group, the turnover of  the whole group 
will be taken into account. 
Exclusivtt purchasing agrttmattnts (Rttgulation 1984183) 
A,reements by which a raeller is oblipd to buy his supplies exclusively from a stated manu-
facturer or other supplier (e.g. wholesaler), without, however, being allotted and exclusive 
sales territory, praent different problems than exclusive distribution agreements. Where a 
supplier has succeeded in tying the most numerous or the largest sales oudets in a given area to 
himself, his c:ompetiton may find it very diffic:ult to sell their goods in that area. The longer 
the duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation and the wider the range of products invol-
ved, the more serious is this barrier to market entry for competiton. 
Also, such arrangements limit the commercial freedom of the resellen, who may often be 
smaller firms. 
34 With cbae CODiiderationa in miacl, the new poup exemption, which parties mUJt take into 
account for all exclUiive purcbaaina ..-menu enteriDg into force  afrer 1 jmuuy 1984, 
thel:efore provides: 
- the maximum duratioa of the exclusive purdwina obliption mUJt be limited to five yean 
(renewable); 
- the raap  of proclucu c:overed by the obliption must be limited to  procluc:u which either by 
their nature or by c:ommerc:ia1 uup  are connected to each other. 
Alide &om thae provisions as to the duration and the rup  of  the obUption, the ume  provi-
liou fouad in the aroup exemptions (both old and new) for exclusive diatribution qreemenu 
apply • 
..,  ad  p.trol. - Special provilioaa are included in the new poup exemptioDI for exclusive 
purchuiaa apeementl relatina to beer (and other drinb)  told for collllllllption on the 1por  (in 
ae.., for example) aDd to petrOl told in aemc:e ationa. 
Normally, aucb apeemenu entail coDiiderable financial involvement on the part of aupplien, 
whicb may thus julbfy bindial the raeller for alonpr  period of time than in other aecton. 
The foDowiaa apecial provisions were therefore deemed appropriate for 1uch beer aupply or 
eenicHtatioa qreemeata: 
(  1) the maximum duration of an exclusive tie for beer alone or for petrOl il  10 yean; 
(1) in beer-supply qreemea.ta, if  the obliption relam to beer and other drinb, the maximum 
duration il s  yean; 
(3) for both beer-supply and eervice-ltation qreemenu, if  the premises where the produc:u 
are eold are IUbject to a teaaac:y apeement between the raeUer ad  the supplier, the dura-
tion of the exclUiive purcbaaina obliptioD can be a1 long a1 the duration of the teiWIC)' 
(eYeD if  it illoapr thm10 yean); 
(  4) a1 to the raqe of produc:tl covered, for beer supply qreemeau, no other products can be 
iDduded in the tie except other drinb: Do  chip~, pmbq  mami,..., etc; for  MrVic:e-
ltatioa qreemenu, the tie can relate only to petroleum-hued motor vebide .fue1l aDd, in 
IIOIDe c:ua to lubricaau to be uaed in a lubrication bay: DO road map1, balll, car-acceuo-
riel etc; 
(S) 8peCial uanlitioul rula apply to such qreemenu. 
Thoee iDterelted  in detailed information  oD  the rul• aovemina beer supply and lei'Yic:e-
atioa qreemeau are adviled to CODIUlt the relevant 'GuideliDet' publilbed in the Official 
Journal. 
S.*eitl• distrihution 
Certain manufacturen may  want their products to be  10ld only by  qualified,  'approved' 
dealen. Thil il paniadady true for tecbnkaUy 10philtic:ated produc:u auch u  elec:tronic: 
equipment, watchea or automObiles. 
3S In such cases, so-called 'selective distribution' systems can be created in which only 'selected' 
dealers are authorized to distribute the goods concerned. 
The selection of the dealers allowed into the system sometimes takes place on the basis of 
purely qualitative criteria which are entirely justified, given  the nature of the product in 
question. For example, dealers may need a minimum amount of  technicallcnowledge, or skil-
led personnel, or suitable premises in order to be able to sell the products in an appropriate 
way. If  all dealers who fulfil these justified quality standards are allowed without discrimina-
tion into the system, there will be no objections as far as the EEC competition rules are con-
cerned. 
It also happens, however, that manufacturers go beyond applying purely qualitative criteria 
when appointing dealers. They may, for example, accept only dealers who are willing to carry 
out sales promotion for the manufacturer's products, or to stoclc his products. 
Dealers who are technically qualified to sell the products concerned but who are unwilling to 
accept these additional obligations, are thus excluded from the system. This is a restriction. 
Even more restrictive is a selection system in which the manufacturer applies quantitative cri-
teria, for example limiting the number of  dealers in an area to the presumed purchasing power 
of the population there. In these cases, dealers who are qualified and moreover willing to 
accept additional obligations may nevertheless be excluded. 
Aside from the need to have qualified dealers for certain products, all the above restrictions 
may seriously harm competition. Such closed distribution systems may be particularly dama-
ging for potential dealers - often small and medium-sized firms - who may be excluded 
without any objective reasons. Also, the dealers who are a part of such a network may be 
seriously hampered in their commercial freedom, for example they may be obliged to sell only 
to other approved dealers. 
These distribution systems can in any event not benefit from the group exemption for exclusi-
ve distribution agreements (see above), because the restrictions go beyond those allowed. 
They may however be exempted on an individual basis if they manifestly improve distribution 
and fulfil all the other conditions for exemption under Article 85 (3 ). It must notably be clear 
that the beneficial results can not be achieved through other, less restrictive means. 
Any indication that a selective distribution system is being used to artificially maintain prices, 
or to exclude in a discriminatory way certain types of retail oudets (for example discount 
shops or supermarkets who are qualified to sell the products), or any attempts to hinder paral-
lel imports through the system, will make exemption highly unlikely, and such distribution 
systems thus remain illegal. Action can then be called for by national courts or by the Com-
mission. 
Automobile sector. - Selective distribution systems are more common in certain sectors than 
in others, often depending on the nature of the products concerned. 
One example is the motor vehicle sector, where manufacturers tend to set up distribution net-
works in which, at all stages, access is reserved only for selected dealers. 
36 Such systems can often be exempted because they are indispensable measures of rationaliza-
tion, and ensure that dealers provide a satisfactory information, maintenance and repair ser-
vice to their customers. 
In order to avoid masses of individual notifications of such motor vehicle distribution systems 
for exemption, the Commission is preparing a group exemption in this sector, which will 
probably go into effect at the end of 1984. It would cover cars, buses, commercial vehicles 
and tracton. 
As drafted, the Regulation would grant an exemption, in principle, for the following types of 
restrictions on the motor dealer: 
- not to sell another manufacturer's vehicles or parts, 
- not actively to seek customers outside his allotted territory, 
- not to sub-contract distribution or servicing and repairs to other dealers or repairers 
without the consent of the manufacturer or his importer, and 
- not to sell new vehicles or replacement parts obtained &om the manufacturer to dealers 
outside the distribution network. 
Also exempted would be a restriction on the manufacturer's &eedom to appoint other dealers 
in the allotted territory during the period of the contract. 
37 Several important coaditiona are included to enaure that: 
- Dealers are not made 10 dependent on the manufacturer or imponer that their freedom to 
compete ia aerioualy diminiabed. 
- Conaumen can have  lefVicin& or repairs done under the manufacturer's warranty any-
where in the common market. 
- Spare parts supplied by third parties matching the quality of those supplied by the motor 
manufacturer can be 10ld and used in the official distribution network. 
- Coosumen can order can with the specification~ required at the place where they are to be 
rqistered &om official dealers in other Member States who are willing to lell the vehicles 
to them, if  the manufacturer or hia imponer lelia the model concerned through the official 
distribution network at both places. 
Indus~lprop~nry 
Industrial property rishts include patents, copyrights, trade marks, performing rishts, rqpate-
red desipa and models; 'know-how' ia not actually a right, but ia 10metime11 treated analo-
goualy. 
At prelellt, how these risbts can be obtained and used ia determined by the national laws of 
each Member State. 
The exiatence of  the~e natioDall)'lteml is in itsel£ perfectly legitimate, but problems ariae 
where the national rule~ are used to partition the common market along national boundaries. 
Thia is a matter relating to the free movement of goods within the Community. 
A leCODd problem relates to how the owner of an industrial property right u~e~ that right or 
allows others to 111e it. Here, the competition rules may be relevant. 
The foUowina general rules are important to bear in mind when dealing with industrial pro-
perty riahts: 
(  1) The principle of the free movement of  goods: once goods protec:ted by industrial property 
rights have been legitimately marketed in Member State A,  by the owner or 10meone 
aucborized to do 10 by him (for example a licensee), the importation of those JOOds into 
Member State B can not be prevented on the basis of the parallel property rishts existing 
under the natioaalleaislation of  Member State B. For example: a manufacturer registers a 
trade mark for hia produas in each Member State where the produas are 10ld, for exam-
ple France and Germany. Once the goods in question have been marketed in Germany, the 
importation of those goods into France can not be stopped by invoking the same trade 
mark it ia registered under in France. 
Of  course, where a third pany unlawfully uses a registered trade mark, the manufacturer 
can take the lleclellary stept; but thia ia a matter of  trade mark infringement, not of  efforts 
to illeplJy partition the common market. 
(2) U an undertakiDa ia in a dominant position in the common market or a  sub~tantial part 
thereof, the improper exploitation of an industrial property right may be in violation of 
38 Anide 86 (abuee of a dominent polition); there mUit, of  coune, be an actual or potential 
effect on trade between Member Stata. 
(3) The owaer of  an industrial property right may decide to c:onfer an emerprile the benefit of 
that npt  - for example, be may let another firm uee his resistered trade mark, or if  be ia 
the owner of a patent, be may ~  a 1ic:ence to manufacture and .U  the aooda to an-
other. Ill reNm, the other party will normally be uked to pay a royalty. Ill itlelf, such 
authorization of a third party to exploit the patent or any other indultria1 property npt  ia 
DOt cauaht by Anide 85(1). Problema may, however,  ari1e when the authorization ia 
accompaaied by daute~  which restrict competition without beias jllltifiecl in that they pro-
tect the industrial property npt. 
Ill paeral, the te1t1 for application of Anide 85(1) or exemption uader Anide 85(3) are 
the same in the area of industrial property npts u  in other areas. 
p.,.,  limui"'  tJI'W1fN'Itl. - Patent licenlin1 apeements aa:ount for alarp  perceatap of 
the DOti6catiolllaubmitted to the Coauniuion for neptive clearance or exemption in the area 
of industrial property npt. 
Such  apeemeot1 may praeat problema in view of the territorial reltriction they impale, 
which can lead to the iaolation of national markets, and the exclusivity they c:onfer on the 
lic:eaaee to manufacture and/  or tell the produc:ts covered by the pateat. 
On the other band, patent liamsinl bu  a number of beneficial upec:ts, in particular for anaU 
and medium-lized enterprile: IUCh apeements allow firma which miaht otberwiae not be in a 
position to do 10, to obtain acce11 to new tecbnolQiiea. Also, patent licalina encourqa the 
innovative activities of anaUer firma which do  DOt have the financ:ialleiOUI'Cel to exploit their 
inventiona tbellllelves tbrouabout the whole Community. 
In recopition of the beneficial effects wbic:b patent licenaina qreements can have, the Com-
million bu for 10111e time been workiq on a poup exemption in this area. The draft aroup 
exempdoa u  publiabed for comments would establiab the followina syRelll: 
(  1) it would pnerally exempt exclusive npts to manufacture and to uee apec:ified products 
&om the prohibition in Anide 85(1) of the Treaty; 
(2) it p1  on to  exempt exduliYe eellina riahts and ac:c:ompanyina export ratric:tiona by anaU 
and meclium-lized firma, for they are the firma who, with their limited finenciel resources, 
uaua1ly have the putat difficulty in exploitina their own  invention~ or haviq them 
exploited by companies within their aroup, and co~~~equendy have to iaiUe lic:eaces; the 
same procec:cion ia pven to anaU and medium-sized firma who receive liceaces; 
(3) it liata a number of obliptiona that do 110( prevent exemption, IUCh u  the obliption not 
to di'YUip bUiineu ~eaets, the obliption to respect quality lt&Ddarda, lf&Dt-back daute~ 
and field-of-ute ratrictions; 
(4) it liata daUiel whole presence in aliceDc:e precludes the benefit of the block exemption, 
such u  no-cbaUenp claUiel, daUiel 1tatina that the lic:eDce ia for an indefinite duration, 
competina products daute~, quantitative reltrictiona and resale price fixiaa. Tbae  daute~ 
reetria competition in luch a way that they can be exempted only individually, and then 
only if  aood reuona are produced; 
39 (5) like the other group exemption regulations, this draft empowers the Commission to with-
draw the benefit of the block exemption in specified cases, notably where the patented 
products are not in competition with similar products in the licensed territory; 
(6) certain areas where the Commission bas not yet acquired adequate experience are ex-
cluded, such as patent pools and aou-licensing. 
Followins consideration of the many comments received after publication and also the judg-
ment of the Court of  Justice in the first case to come before it on exclusive licences, the Com-
mission plans to make a number of  amendments to the draft before adoption of  the final regu-
lation, probably at the end of 1984. IV.  Enforcement of the competition rules by the Commission 
- Procedural matters 
The competition rules of the EEC Treaty can be applied directly by national courts. For 
example, a party to an agreement which is the subject of litigation before a national court can 
argue that the agreement is void - and thus unenforceable by the other side - because it 
infringes Anicle 85 of the Treaty. Likewise, a firm may plead before a national court that a 
dominant enterprise is involved in abusive behaviour - for example, is trying to drive the 
complainant out of buliness by severely undercutting his prices. National courts can deter-
mine the appropriate remedies in such cases, pouibly accompanied by an award of damages 
to the injured party. 
Running parallel to the pouibility of such actions before national courts is an elaborate pro-
cedure of application of the competition rules by the Commission. In some ways, this proced-
ure has further-reaching consequences for the firms involved than actions at national level, in 
that, for example: 
- the Commiuion has the power to impose administrative  fi~s  for infringement of the com-
petition rules; 
- the Commiuion has extensive powers to collect the information it needs in order to deter-
mine whether an infringement is taking place; 
41 -only  the Commiuion hu  the power to grant exemptions on the basis of Article 85(3); 
- the Commiuion can take interim meuures to brliJI to an immediate halt damaaing behav-
iour. 
The procedure before the Commisaion can not, however, culminate in an award of damages 
to the victim; fina impolcd are paid to the Commission, not to the injured party. 
There are various waya in which procedures before the Commission can be started. Some are 
more relevant for small and medium-sized enterprises than othen. For example, smaller firms 
may  be more interested in the poaibilities of submitting complaints to the Conunission 
apinst abusive behaviour by dominant firms than in the notification procedure. Nonetheless, 
for the sake of  completeneu, amall and medium firms should be aware of  the various proced-
ures which they may become involved in. 
The beginning of  a procedure 
There are a number of  waya in which a procedure before the Commission involvins the com-
petition rules can be set in motion: 
- notification, for neptive clearance or for exemption, 
-complaints, formal or informal, 
-own-initiative action by the Conunission, 
- leCtor investiptions by the Commission. 
Notification 
The tMchanism of  notification 
Apeements between enterpriles and decisions by associations (e.g. trade associations) may be 
submitted to the Commiuion to seek a decision from the latter that the agreement does not 
violate Article 85(1) at aU (this ia a neptive clearance) or that the agreement does fa)] under 
Article 85(1) but meets the conditions for exemption under Article 85(3). Although the cor-
rect terminology ia 'application for neptive clearance' and 'notification for exemption', the 
term 'notification' ia used for both poaibilities. In faa, applicants will normally submit one 
ootific:ation to the Conunission seeking negative clearance or, in the alternative, individual 
exemption. 
N. B.: No notification ia neceuary when an agreement falls under one of the group exemp-
tions. 
Notification must be made in writing on an official form issued by the Commiuion, called 
'Form A/B'. Thia form requires the applicant(s) to give detailed information relating to the 
parties to the agreement and the es~ential features and aims of the agreement; to avoid any 
pouible misundentandins, it ia witt to attach a copy of the apeement in its entirety to the 
form. Nacificatinn aeecl DOt be DWie by all thole coadudiaa an aareemeat. but whoever taka it 
upoa hillllelf to DOtify must in any event be a party to the qreemeat. Offic:iaUy authorized 
repraeatativel arc abo permitled to IUbmit a notificatioa. 
FiDally, eoterprilellhould be aware of the importance of 111bmittiq accurate, complete and 
truthful ialormatioa in their noci6c:atiooa: the Commiuion lw  the power to impale fiDes of 
up to 5 000 ECU where applicaata iateotioaally or through nealipncc 111pply incotrec:t or 
mieJeadq information in a DOtific:atioa. 
Copies of  FormA/Band the ac;a,mpanyq aplaaatory memorandum pnpand by the Com-
millioa can be obtaiaecl from the Commiuion'1 Infonnation <>fficJII iD each Member State 
and allo outlide the EEC. A lilt  of tbae aclclrcua can be found at the back of tbil pide. 
There are two main reuona why notification can be very important to finlll: 
- u a ruJe the Commiuion can DOt Jr&Dt neptive dearance or an iDclividual exemption with 
repni to any ...-meat wbic:b lw  DOt been notified to it in the proper awmer; 
- no aclmiDiltratift &Del can be impaled by the Commillion for ac:tiYitiel which take place 
after aoc:ificatioa and until the Commiuion readte1 a dec:Uion, fiDal ex provilional, u  to 
the appJic:ability of An:ide 85(1) and/or Article 85(3), provided thole activitiel do DOt 10 
be,oad thole delcribed  in the notification. 
-43 The linea which can be imposed for actual violation of Articles 85( 1) and 86 must be distingu-
ished &om the (more minor) fines which can be imposed where a notification intentionally or 
oqlipady contains misleading or untruthful information. 
There are two exc::eptions to the general rule that to obtain an exemption under article 85(3), 
the asreement in question must be notified to the Commission: 
- agreements which fall under one of the group exemptions are automatically exempted; 
- certain types of agreement do not have to be notified, and can nevertheless, if  the case 
arites, be exempted by the Commitaion retrospeCtively to the date on which the agreement 
was concluded. In broad lines, the requirement to notify does not apply to: 
(1) qreements between parties located only in one Member State and not relating to im-
ports or exports, in other words, agreements which are purely domestic or local in 
scope; 
(2} qreementl between two parties only in which the sole restriction is a unilateral restric-
tion on one of the parties as to prices and terms of male or as to the exercise of indo-
atrial property rishts or know-how; 
(3) agreements between two parties only which have as their sole object 
•  the development or uniform application of certain standards or types, or 
•  joint raearch and development, or 
•  specialization in manufac:turin&, where the market share is not more than 15% and 
agrepte annual turnover not more than 200 million ECU. 
A caveat should be added: 
- in cue any doubt exists as to whether a particular agreement falls under one of  the catego-
ries for which notification is not required, the parties should not hesitate to notify; 
- the advice 'when in doubt, do notify' is especially important because the benefit of immun-
ity from fines is available only with respect to notified agreements and agreements covered 
by group exemptions. 
Quiclc checklist in connection with notification 
Whea deciding whether or not an agreement should be notified to the Commission, under-
takiap should run through the following questions: 
(1) Does the agreement have any connection at all with competition? If not- for example if 
the agreement concerns a simple sale of  goods - there is no need to contemplate notifica-
tion. 
(2) If  the agreement does feature certain restrictions on competition, are the competition rules 
nevertheless inapplicable because, e.g. the effects are minimal, or the activity is covered by 
one of the relevant Commitaion notices. If  so, parties need not notify. 
(3) If  the agreement seenulikely to contain elements which are contrary to Article 85( 1  ), but 
also appean to the parties to fulfil the requirements for exemption under Article 85(3), 
parties must determine: 
- whether the agreement falls under one of the group exemptions; 
if  so, no need to notify, the agreement is safe and no fines can subsequendy be imposed; 
44 - whether the asreement is one of the types of agreements for which notification is not 
required; if  10, no need to notify, exemption can if  necessary be obtained later, even in 
the abtence of notification. One risk in not notifying is, however, that immunity from 
fines is not auaranteed. 
If  neither of the above applies, parties should make the proper notification on Form A/B 
as  IOOD as pouible after concluding the agreement (or even before): the importance of 
timely notification lies in the fact that fines may still be imposed for the period preceding 
notification. 
Complaints 
G.Mral 
Anticompetitive behaviour can be brought to the attention of the Commiasion by way of a 
complaint. 
Potential complainants should fint carefully consider a number of questions: 
- Is the object of the complaint autonomous behaviour by undertakinp, or is the behaviour 
imposed by national legislation? In the latter case1 the competition rules do not apply. 
- Is there a transfrontier effect involved in the behaviour? If  not, the matter would be one of 
national, not Community, competence. 
-Are  all the other elements of either Article 85 or 86 fulfilled? For actiona under Article 85, 
the complainant should check whether the agreement in question is perhaps tU minimis. In 
that case, there is no point in complaining. For Article 86 cases, a dominant position is 
required - not always an easy requirement to prove - and there must be an abuse there-
of. 
-Would action before a national court be preferable in connection with  the question of 
damages? 
In sum, in order to avoid wasting the time of all involved, complaints should only be submit-
ted after due reflection. 
Who can complain 
Those entitled to submit complaints are Member State authorities, individuals or legal per-
sons, such as companies or trade associations. 
One essential requirement is that a complainant must have a legitimate interest in the termina-
tion of the objectionable behaviour. Parties to an agreement would in any event be deemed to 
have a legitimate interest. Furthermore, any third party who can show that the allqed anti-
competitive behaviour is damaging - even potentially - to him will normally have a legiti-
mate interest. 
45 CoftU4WNUS 
When a complaint is IUbmittecl by a party bavins a I.,.Ptimate interest in the matter, the Com-
millioa will evmine wbecher a violation of the competition rules is in fact takina place. Jl the 
aaplaim  tum1 out  to be well-fouaded, the CommiuioD can then take the nec:euary meuures 
to put Ill ead CO the infrinpmeut. If, on the other band, the Commilaion, after ex•minin1 the 
matter, fiDcla that the ClOIIIplaint is DOt juttified, it m111t inform the complaiDant of  ita reuona 
for DOt punuiJII the matter. The complainlllt must then be allowed a certain period of  time to 
111bmit Ill}' further c:ommentl, after which the Commilaion will either continue ita inveatip-
tion, if  new facta have come to lilbt, or delinitely reject the complaint. 
Fom1 and contlmts of  a complai"t 
There are no specific requiremeatl u  to the form in which a complaint is made. However, 
pen  the fact that the Commiuion is only oblipcl co inveatipte aiO-Callecl formal complaint, 
by a party lhowiq  aieptimate interest in the matter, it is in the interest of the complainant to 
dearly praent the facta involved in writinl. A apec:ial form ('Form C' - available from the 
CommiuioD'11Dlormation Officellisced at the back of  this pide)  exists which can be Uled for 
this purpoiC, but a limple letter isiUffic:ient. The complaint mould in ay  event include: 
- the name and 8ddreu of the complainant; 
- the identity of the undertaldq(1) which are the IUbject of the complaint; 
- evidence which IUppOrtl the complainant'• claim to a lesitiJDate interelt in the matter; 
- a clear daaipdon of the IUbacance of the complaint and, if  pouible, the reuona why the 
complainant believes the behaviour in question conatitutet an infrinaement of Article 85 
ad/or 86; 
- if  the complaint isliped by a representative, evidence of hi1 authority to act on behalf of 
the complainant. 
The party under attack will be informed of the complaint aaainlt him and given the opport-
unity to praent his views. In this context, the complainant would be well adviled to clearly 
indicate which pam of his complaint are to be conaiderecl u  confidential and thUI not trans-
mitted to the party under attack. 
I"fom~al  or anonymous complai"ts 
The Commilaion abo receives oral complaintl and 10metimes aonymoUI complaintl. The 
difference with the 'formal' complaintl described above is that the Commiuion is under no 
obliption to ex•mine IUCh 10-Callecl 'informal' complaintl, althoup it may of coune do 10 if 
itwilha. 
Therefore, where there isleriOUI evidence that an ~t  of the competition rules is 
takinl place, any uadertakina which is beins harmed by the behaviour in quation mould con-
template the advantap of lodainla formal complaint in writin1. Own-iDitia!We intervention by the CoiiUDiuioa 
There arc a variety of way• in which the Commiuion can become aware of  pouibly anticom-
petitive behaviour: quationa railed in the European Parliament, artida  in newapapen, infor-
mation received from Member State authoritiel, or contac:tl with interest sroupa, auch u con-
aumer orpnizationa. Althoush the Commiuion il  not oblipd to punue matten which come 
to ita attention in tbil way, it can decide on ita own initiative to enmine further auch cues and 
will definitely do 10 if  the information it baa received lftml to point to a aerioua infrinpment 
of the competition rulea. 
Furthermore, the Commiuion hu the power to condua seneral enquiriel into economic aec:-
ton  where it feela competition ia beiDa reatriaed or  diltorted. Such enquiriea have for example 
taken place in the brewery induatry and the margarine induatry. 
Fact1inding by the Commission - procedural decisions 
Where the Commiuion decidea that commercial aaivitiea which have come to ita attention 
aeem to poae problema in the context of the competition rulea, it will normally need more 
information to be able to reach a definite opinion on the legality of  the behaviour in quation. 
There arc two baaic: way• in which  the Commiuion can obtain information from  under-
takinp: 
- written request~ for information, 
- inveatiptiona. 
Requaa for information 
The Commiuion can lend written requeata (including telexea) for information not only to 
undertakinp which are auapeaed of infrinpments but alao to third partiea who may be in a 
polition to clarify certain matten. For example, where the Commiuion ia  ex1mini111 the 
behaviour of 1 dominant firm, it may uk  unaller firma who have dealinp with that firm to 
indicate whether they have ever been aubject to specific abuaive treatment by it. 
Requeata for information involve the following conaequencea: 
- where the undertakinp interrogated reply promptly, correctly and completely to the Com-
miuion'aletter, no further complication• need be feared (althoup the Commiuion may of 
coune aubsequendy requeat additional supplementary information); 
- if  in their reply the undertakinp concerned provide incorrea or incomplete information, 
the Commiuion hu the npt  to impoae finea of up to S 000 ECU; 
- if the undertakinp chooae to ignore the initial requeat for information altogether, or if 
their reply il incomplete, the Commiuion may as 1 aecond 1tep take a formal dec:ilion 
orderina complete information to be supplied. Failure to reapond to tbil formal dec:ilion il 
not to be recommended, because daily default finea of up to 1 000 ECU can be impoaed by 
the Commillion until a complete reply is finally received. 
47 In sum,  undertakings who  receive  a request for  information from  the Commillion must 
serioualy bear in mind: 
- that if  they dec:ide to reply, that reply must be correct and complete; 
- that if  they do not reply to the fint request for information, they stand the risk of subae-
quendy being forced to reply anyway, if  necessary, by means of daily default payments. 
lnvestiptiont 
The Conuniuion baa the power to send authorized officials to the premises of  undertakinp in 
order to gather the information it needs. The officials who make an inspection visit are entit-
led to examine the company's butineu records and documents, take copies or extrac:ta there-
of, request explanations and enter all premises, land or vehicles beloDJing to the company. 
Apin, u  in the c:ase of  written requeata for information, undertakings who submit to such an 
inapcaion but produce the material requested in incomplete form run the riak of  fines of up to 
S OOOECU. 
Undertakings are not obliged to admit Commillion officials who come on inspection, but the 
Conuniuion may then proceed to take a formal decision ordering them to comply, if  ne(:el-
aary reinforced by a daily penalty payment of up to 1 000 ECU for each day the undertaking 
refuses to admit the Comrniaion inspectors. 
The Commillion is not oblised fint to give the undertaking concerned the opportunity to 
comply with an invesriaation based on a simple mandate before passing on to the more force-
ful instrument of ordering the undertaking to comply by a formal decision. Normally, the 
Commillion will resort to an unannounced visit by decision at the outset where a serious risk 
exists that the undertakings, if  forewarned of the inspection, will destroy any incriminating 
evidence. 
Undertakinga who receive a visit from Commission inspectors are allowed to ask a legal advi-
ser to be present, but the inspection can not be unduly delayed to await the arrival of such a 
person. 
The procedure leading to a final decision 
The three basic types of  decisions which the Commillion can take in applicarion of  Articles 85 
and 86 are: 
- decisions granting negative clearance; 
-exemption decisions pursuant to Article 85(3); 
- decisions ordering the termination of an infringement. 
The procedural decisions which the Commission can take in connection with its powers of 
investigation, for example orderins an undertaking to admit Commiaaion inspectors, have 
been dealt with in the preaeding paragraph. 
48 Other measures which may occur when the Commission deals with a case are: 
- interim measures, 
- provisional decisions, 
- informal settlements. 
Neptive clearance 
When an undertaking has made an application on Form A/8, seeking formal assurance from 
the Commiuion that its agreement or other commercial activities are not deemed to infringe 
the competition rules, the Commission must fint give any other interested parties the chance 
to make their views on the matter known. This is done by publishing the main facts of  the case 
- in the Official Journal. Any interested parties are given a specific: period of time to react to 
this publication and new facts may be brought to light which cause the Commission to recon-
sider its position. 
A 1ee0nd formality which must be observed before negative clearance can be given is consul-
tation of Member State authorities, who meet for this purpose in a body referred to as the 
'Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions'. 
If  after these steps have been observed the Commission maintains the view that negative clea-
rance is justified, a formal decision is taken which stares that on the basis of the facts in its 
posseuion, there are no grounds for the Commission to take any action under Article 85(1) 
and/  or Article 86 against the agreement or other commercial activity involved. 
It is clear that if  new facts subsequendy arise or if  the circumstances involved change substan-
tially, the Commission retains the power to reconsider the matter. Until now, however, no 
cases have ever occurred in which the Commission has gone baclc on a decision granting nega-
tive clearance. 
Exemption 
As  in the case of negative clearances, a decision granting exemption must be preceded by 
publication in the Official Journal of  the main elements involved, giving interested parties the 
opportunity to submit any observations, and by consultation of the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. 
The Commission's decision  indicates why  the  agreement  or other activity  in  question  is 
deemed to violate Article 85(1) and what elements have been found by the Commission which 
fulfil all the requirements for justifying an exemption under Article 85(3). 
Exemption is always granted for a fixed period of time, which can be extended. The decision 
may impose certain obligations on the undertakings involved and in some cases, the parties 
may be requested to modify certain aspects of their agreement before exemption can be gran-
ted at all. 
49 Normally, exemption can only be granted as of  the date of  notification; only in the case of  cer-
tain types of ap-eements which need not be notified (see above) can exemption be granted as 
of the date on which the agreement, was concluded. 
When a matter comes to its attention through a complaint, a notification or in any other way, 
the Conuniuion may reach the preliminary conclusions that a violation of  Article 85(1) or 86 
is ta1ciq place and, in the case of notifications, that the conditions for granting an exemption 
under Article 85(3) are not present. 
The Conuniuion must give the parties concerned notice of its objections to their behaviour in. 
the form of a written communication known as the 'statement of objections'. Annexed to the 
statement of  objections is a list of  the documents which constitutes the Commission's file in a 
particular case. In order to prepare their response, parties may examine the file on the Com-
million's premises, although documents of a confidential nature, for example concerning 
other undertakinp' business secrets or internal Conunillon notes, are normally not accessi-
ble. Parties are given a specific time limit - normally one or two months, depending on the 
complexity of the case - to respond in writing to the Commission's objections. 
After their written response, parties can also request an opportunity to argue their case orally. 
This 'oral heariq' as it is called, is organized by the Directorate General for Competition and 
is conducted by the Hearins Officer. This official sees to it that the rights of the defence are 
respected and has the risht to make observations to ensure that in the procedure leading to the 
Conuniuion's decision, due account is taken of all the relevant facts, whether favourable or 
unfavourable to the parties concerned. 
Following the oral hearing, the Commission must consult the Advisory Committee on Restric-
tive Practices and Dominant Positions. 
Only after all these procedural steps have taken place can the Commission come to a final 
decision. 
Contents of  the tkcision 
Where an infringement is found to exist, the Commission will order the undertaking involved 
to put an end to it forthwith, a so-called 'cease and desist' order. Of course where the parties 
have already terminated the infringement, for example during the course of the procedure 
before the Commiuioo, the dec:Won may simply consist of a declaration that the behaviour in 
question constituted an infringement. 
If appropriate, the Conuniuion also has the power to order positive action by the under-
takinp involved. For example, where a dominant undertaking has been found to abuse its 
position by refusing to supply a customer, the Commission may require that finn to resume 
supplies within a specified period and ensure appropriate supply arrangements for the future. 
so Pirw 
The Commiuion baa dle power to impole fines of up 1 million ECU or 10% of dle world 
aaaual curnover of the undertakia& CODClei'Ded iD the previous bu.m.  year (wbk:bever of cbe 
twO is pater),  where undenakiDp are found to have iDfriDpd Article 85(1) or 86, ~ 
naUy or throgp ,..ipna, 
Whether or not a fine will be impolecl, and dle determiaatioa of  the UDOUDt of the fiae, will 
depend, aJilODI oda thiup, oo dle ICrioumeu of the behaviour, how loai it weat on, the 
lize of the UDdercakiap involved, a deliberate infriapment willllGI'ID.IlJy daetve a heavier 
fiae than where undenakiDp can oaly be aa:uaed of nePP""'· Adivitiel"which have been 
frequendy attacked by the Coaunillion iD the past wiU allo warraat heavier linea, becauee 
wsdertakiap lhould realize, tbroup the calC law built up by dle Commi'lion, that IUCh 
behaviour is Dot allowed. 
With rapect to notified qreemenu, fines can not be impoted for the period between the 
momeat of notification aDd the Commiuioa's clecision, proviaioaal or definite (tee below). 
Pina are, however, pouible for the period during which dle qreemenc wu iD force before 
notification. 
51 Al10, where the Commission refu~e~ to grant an exemption, the result is that the agreement in 
question, whose illegality is thus confirmed, may give rise to actions in national courts, for 
example for damages. 
Interim measures 
Dependins on the complexity of any given case, it may take the Commission one or two years 
or even more to reach a final decision. During that time, the behaviour in question may give 
rile to aerious and irreparable damage to, for example, a complainant, whose very existence is 
threatened, or it may be totally unacceptable for the general public interest. In such cases of 
urpncy, the Commission has the power to talce immediate action in the form of so-called 
'interim measures' to stop the objectionable behaviour. Such measures are of a temporary 
nature aimed at safeguarding the staiNs quo and do not determine the final outcome of the 
matter being dealt with. 
Provisional decisions 
The pneral rule is that once an agreement has been notified, no fines can be imposed with 
respect to the period after notification. This immunity from fines can, however, be lost where 
the Conuniuion talces  a provisional decision informing the parties that after preliminary 
examination, it is of the opinion that Article 85(1) applies and exemption under Article 85(3) 
is not justified. 
H  the parties disreprd this warning, they run the serious risk of being fined in the Commis-
sion's final decision. 
Iaformal settlements - 'administrative letters' 
For the sake of expediency, many cases before the Commission are concluded by way of an 
informal settlement, notably where the undertalcings involved voluntarily eliminate any objec-
tionable practices. In fact, the Commission normally talces a dozen or  10 formal decisions each 
year, whereas the number of  such informal settlements is usually several hundred. 
In 10me ca~e~, informal settlements take place by way of 'administrative letters' in which the 
Conuniuion services inform the parties that it sees no rea10n to take any action under the 
competition rules and that the relevant file will therefore be closed. Such letten are admini-
strative documents and do not have the legally binding effects of  decisions, but may neverthe-
leu be useful as guidance. Al10, the Commission's recendy instituted practice of  publishing a 
notice of its intention to iuue an administrative letter in certain cases, allowing third parties to 
react before it takes any further steps, enhances the value of such administrative letters. 
52 Publicity 
Decisions granting negative clearance, exemption or ordering the termination of an infringe-
ment, as well as interim measures and provisional decisions, must be published in the Official 
journal. Procedural decisions, such as those formally requesting an undertaking to supply 
information, need not be published in the Official journal, but the Commission may neverthe-
less decide to do so, for example in cases of general interest. 
The Commission normally issues press releases regarding the decisions it has taken. Press 
releases can also be used to make the general public aware of informal settlements which for. 
some reason contain important elements which are of general interest. 
Finally, the Commission's monthly Bulletins, as well as the annual Reports on Competition 
Policy contain information on the decisions and informal settlements that have taken place. 
Control over the Commission by the European Court of  Justice 
The European Court of justice has the following powers of review over decisions taken by the 
Commission: 
-the  Court has the power to confirm, reduce, cancel or increase fines and penalty payments 
imposed by Commission decisions; 
- all formal decisions by the Commission can be reviewed and if  necessary annulled by the 
Court: negative clearances, decisions granting or refusing exemption, orders to terminate 
infringements, decisions requesting information, orders to submit to an investigation and 
provisional decisions relating to the immunity from fines (see above). 
Furthermore, appeals can be brought before the Court where the Commission has failed to 
act, for example failure to examine a formal complaint that has been submitted to it or to 
inform the complainant of its reasons for not pursuing the matter after preliminary examina-
tion. 
Those entided to bring actions before the Court are all natural or legal persons against whom 
a decision has been taken as well as any other parties who are directly and personally affected 
by a decision. 
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Page 54 in the original is blank. V.  State aids 
Another aapect of Community competition policy that may interest mWl and medium-lized 
buaineues is the control of national aids. Under Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty this 
control ia exercised by the Commiuion. 
Article 92 EEC Treaty 
Puqraph 1 of Article 92 provides that, as a general rule, all government aid to bulineu is 
forbidden: 'Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
throush State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or  threateos to distort competi-
tion by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
aHects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.' 
The concept of  'aid' is a good deal wider than just government grants, cheap loans and interest 
sublidies, where the gratuitous dement is immediatdy obvious. It also covers such forms of 
support as tax conc:euions, public guarantees of  corporate borrowins from bank or the capi-
ss tal market, provision of goods and services on preferential terms, and, in some circumstances, 
the acquisition of  public shareholdings in businesses. Any other measure having an equivalent 
effect will also fall within the definition. 
Paragraph 2 of  Artick 92 goes on to provide that certain types of aid are nevertheless compati-
ble with the common market, namely aid having a social character which is granted to indivi-
dual consumers, provided that it is granted without di.sc:rimination related to the origin of  the 
produc:ts concerned, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters, and aid requi-
red to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused to certain areas of the Federal 
Republic of Germany by the division of Germany. 
Paragraph 3 of  Article 92 then lists several other categories of aid that may be considered com-
patible with the common market: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of Jiving is abnor-
mally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c)  aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest; and 
(d) such other categories of  aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by a qual-
ified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 
Article 93 EEC Treaty 
Under paragraph 3 of Article 93 the Member States of the Community are required to notify 
the ColllDliuion, well in advance, of any plans to introduce new aid schemes or alter existing 
ones so that the Commission can determine whether they fall within one or other of  the excep-
ted categOries and so can be allowed to go ahead. The Member State may not implement the 
aid scheme until the ColllDliuion has taken a final decision. 
The Commission has two months in which to define its position on a notified scheme. If  it 
considers the scheme to be compatible with the common market, the Member State is infor-
med that the scheme may go ahead. 
If  it does not think it will be able to authorize the scheme, however, it opens a special proce-
dure, which is laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 93. Under this procedure, the Commission 
gives the Member State a certain period, usually a month, in  which to defend its scheme 
against the objections the Commission has raised. Comments are also invited from the other 
Member States and from other interested parties, the latter being informed by publication of a 
notice in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
At the end of the procedure, the Commission takes a final  decision in which it takes into 
acc:ount the arguments of the Member State concerned and the reactions of  the other Member 
56 States and interested parties. It may decide to drop its objections or to order the Member State 
to abandon the ac:heme or to alter it in some way. 
In any event, the Commission is obliged to follow the Article 93(2) procedure before turning 
down any notified aid ac:heme. 
If  the Member State disagrees with the Commission's decision on ita aid ac:heme, it has two 
months in which to demand a judicial review by the Court of  Justice. 
A Member State failing to comply with a decision within the prescribed time, however, can 
itaelf be brought before the Court of  Justice by the Commission or any other interested Mem-
ber State. 
The Conunitaion has the power to order a Member State to recover from the recipient any aid 
it has granted unlawfully, that is to say, without prior notification of the ac:heme or before, or 
in defiance of, the Commission's decision in the case of a scheme that was notified. 
The Commission also has a duty, under paragraph 1 of Article 93, to keep existing aid 
syltelllS under collltant review and to issue appropriate recommendations to Member States 
where the progressive development or functioning of the common market so requires. Exist-
ing ac:hemes include both those in force before the common market waa founded and those 
introduced later with the Conunitaion's approval. If  the Commission finds that, for one rea-
son or another, such an aid ac:heme is no longer compatible with the common market, it issues 
appropriate recommendations to either amend or abolish it. If  the Member State refu1e1 to 
take the action recommended, the Commission initiates the Article 93(2) procedure; in the 
case of  an existing ac:heme this does not have the same effect of suspending implementation as 
it does in the case of a new ac:heme, that is the Member State can continue to award aid under 
the ac:heme until the Commission has taken a formal decision. 
Guiding principles of  the control of  State aid to small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
AU Member States dispense aid in one form or another to small and medium-sized firms. As a 
rule, this aid will fall  under article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty. The few instances on record 
where this was not considered to be the case have involved aid to aaft  busines~es, the retail 
trade and the professions where it was clear that the aid would have no impact on intra-EEC 
competition and trade. In these cases the Commission considered that the aid did not fall 
within the aiteria of Article 92(1). 
In normal circumstances, however, government aid to small and medium-sized businesses will 
be liable to distort intra-Community competition and trade, and especially so in industries 
where the small firms' output is extensively traded between EEC countries. 
For a case to be considered to fall within one of the categories of exceptions to the general 
principle of incompatibility, and in particular the exception in subparagraph (c) of Article 
92( 3) for 'aid to facilitate the development of  certain economic activities', the aided firms must 
57 be makio& 10me qllid pro q110 for the aid that is not only in the national interest but also in 
that of the Community, and the aid must not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest. The latter criterion to a considerable extent depends on the industry of 
the recipients, the intensity of the aid and the overall budget for the scheme. 
The Commiuion generally taka  a sympathetic attitude towards aid to the small and medium-
sizeclleCtOr and often authorizes such schema on the basis of the exception in Article 92(3) 
(c). It is c:onac:ious of  the handicaps faced by smaller firms. Their legal form and size puts them 
at a c:liudvantage in obtainina finance.  They may be too small for long production runs, so 
that their COlts of  production are high. They may laclc the scientific and technical raourc:ea for 
mearch and development. And very often they will also suffer from handicaps in the field of 
manapment, organization and marketing. 
In applying the exception in subparagraph (c) of Article 92(3) to national aid to small and 
medium-sized firms the Commission is also mindful of  the imponant pan  played by such enter-
prises in economic growth and employment creation, and of their deciaive contribution to 
mainfainins effective competition in both the national and Community markets and to a bal-
anced social and economic development of the regions. 
All these wider benefits - which are in the Community's as well as in the national interest -
can, in the Commission's opinion, be regarded as a sufficient quid pro quo by the small firm 
leCtOr to justify certain national aid. 
This makes it easier for the Commission to condone aid to a small or medium-sized firm than 
to a large company. 
Before giving the go-ahead to a national aid scheme for small businesses with specific referen-
ces to the size factor, the Commission must be sure that the beneficiaries do fall into the small 
and medium-sized cateSOry. The exact size criterion may vary, however, depending on the 
industry and the objective of the aid in question. 
For aid to be described u  facilitating the 'development' of certain economic activities, it must 
not be just a holding operation, artificially keeping alive businesses that are uncompetitive. 
This is mostly the case with operating aid, that is aid which is not conditional on new invest-
ment or the creation of new jobs. Operating aid, even to small firms, is highly damaging to 
intra-Community competition and trade, as it shows up directly in the firms' coats and compe-
titiveneu and harms competins enterprises that do not receive it. For this reason, the Com-
million does not normally allow such aid, even if  the recipients are small or  medium-sized enter-
prises. It considers that such aid would affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest. 
Nevertheleu, some aid to small firms that is not strictly linked to investment may be author-
ized if  it is a temporary measure to offset the specific handicaps small firms have compared 
with large companies, and to bring them to the point where they can compete normally 
withoutpublicsuppon. 
The Commission is thus quite willing to accept state aid, in the form of guarantees or direct 
finance, to cover expenditure other than that strictly connected with investment. Such eligible 
58 forma of  cxpeoditure may iDc:lude, for example, the COlt of research and developmeat work 
c:ontractecl out to otben or CODIUitanc:y lerYica to improve the manapment, iDtemal orpai-
zation or d.iltribution arranpmentl of anall firma. They may even exleDCl to expenditure to 
ICt up joint extemallerVica common to 1everal firma or orpnize ltrUc:tUnd cooperation bet-
ween them. 
Aid to the small business sector the Commission will authorize 
The type of aid Member States ch001e to extend to anall firma will depend on the problems 
that have to be IOived, which will vary at different ltapl  of  a bulineu'•life: whether it il  jUit 
IWtina up or il  already an atablilbecl bulineu, bein& extended or IWitchina to a new field, or 
cbanama bandl. 
The aid to anall and medium-lized firma which the Commiaion lw  authorized in the pat 
under Artide 92(3) (c:) of  the EEC Treaty baa often taken one of the f'o1lowiJII foi'IDI: 
- P'Ultl, low-interelt loan~ or loan guarantee~ to help 1111111 bulineuel pt  ltarted; 
- low-interest loan~  or loan guarantee~  for investment by IDllll bnaineun, which offer them 
term1 matchin1 th01e which the IIIJCit companiel are able to obWn on the capital market 
or&ombanb; 
- public IUpport to encourage the flow of risk capital to the unall buaiDeu leCtor; the Com-
million baa, for example, authorized a number of  aid lchema involviq lpecitliHCI public: 
•  .,.....;a bufinl temporary ltakel in IDllll firma, the exteDiion of aovemment parantea 
for private venture capital companiel taldna temporary ltlkel in IUcb firml, or  the arant of 
IUbordinated JOVemment loiDI enabq the firm  to obtain further IOIDI on that baail 
&om the bankina leCtor; 
- Jl'IDtl for raearch and development. Al1111all firma do not alwaJI have the ltaff  or fac:ili-
tiel to carry out R & D theDllelva, 10111e Member States have introduced, with the Com-
million'• approval, aid IChema daiped to reduce the COlt of  R & D work contrac:ted out 
to otberl; 
- arana or low-interat loiDI to innovation projec:a undertaken by 1111111 or medium-lized 
buliDel1e1 (development of new produc:a or manufac:turina proc:e11e1 or radic:al improve-
ment of exiltinl produc:a or proc:eae~), which miaht not proceed without aovernment 
IUpport becauu of  the hiah risk they involve in both tec:hnoloP:al and 6nancinl terma; 
- arana or  low-interat loiDI to invatment projec:ta involviq  enerJY or raw materialuvinp 
or the replac:ement of  oil by alternative fuell; 
- srana  toward. the COlt of improvina IIDall firm1' mantpment or ula  policy with the help 
of outside conaultana or computerization. 
In line with tbil poeral approach to IIDall blllinell, the Commiuion baa deared a number of 
propollll for lettiq up new aid lchema for the IIDall firm  leCtor or for alteriq exiltiq 
lcbema. In 10me c:a1e1 it baa iDiilted on a loweriq of the lize limia for eiipbility to eDIUre 
that only anall or medium-lized firma c:an benefit under the lcheme. 
59 Aid for exports 
Any advantapa Member States confer on their industry to allist exports are also aid. Support 
of sales in other Member States always falls under Article 92(1 ). The position invariably taken 
by the Conuniuion in such cases is that it is inconsistent with the principles of the common 
market for a Member State to use aid in order to artificially expand its industry's sales in fel-
low EEC countries to the detriment of businesses in those countries which do not receive such 
aid. Whatever its form, intensity, motive or purpose, such aid is  ineligible for any of the 
exceptiona &om the ban on aid. It is always apt to affect intra-Community trade to an extent 
contrary to the common interest and this applies equally when the recipients are small or 
medium-sized firms. 
60 Conclusion 
A  c:onc:ile overview of the complicated rules which form EEC competition law can not pretead 
to give a ready anawer to every imaginable question that may arile in practic:e. 
Our hope ia that thia pide will provide undertakinp with a sufficieady complete picture to 
eoable them in the fint place to rec:opize lituationa in which the competition ru1et may be 
relevant mel in the leCODCl place to deal with potential confliaa by thellllelves, at any event in 
• preliminary ltqe. 
-
61 Where undertakinp are for whatever reason not in a position to reach an acceptable conclu-
sion  about the leplity of a given matter, expert advice should of course be  aoupt, for 
example via national or European trade asaociations, federations of industry, chambers of 
commerce, European Parliamentarians, and any other orpnizations serving the interest of 
European industry, including, last but not least, the competition services of the European 
Commiuion. 
The lqialative texts referred to in this Guide can be found in Comp•tition Law ;,  the EEC 
arrd ;,. th1 .ECSC- Office for Offic:ial Publications of  the EC- 1981. 
62 European Communities- Commiuion 
Luxembocq: Office for Of6cial Publicatioaa of the European Communities 
1983-62 pp. - 16.2 x 22.9 an 
European Docmaenutioa aeries-1983/1984 
DA, DE, GR., EN, FR., IT, NL 
ISBN 92-825-4156-8 
Catalope number: CB-38-83-750-EN-C 
This publication .erves u  a practical pide for amall and medium-lized enterpri11e1 to the EEC 
competition rules. In the same collection (continued) 
The Customs union (third edition) 
Europe as seen by Europeans- Ten years of European polling 
The European Community's environmental policy (second edition) 
Brochures for businessmen (in the same collection) 
Grants and loans from the European Community 
Public supply contracts in the European Community 
Government procurement in Japan: the way in 
Other publications for the general public 
Working together- The institutions of the European Community- By E. Noel, Secretary-General of 
the Commission of the European Communities 
Steps to European unity - Community progress to date: a chronology 
European File - Each month two topics of current European events 
Bulletin of the European Communities - A monthly survey covering milestones in the building of 
Europe 
Basic statistics- Published annually, an essential statistical guide to the Community 
Colour map - The European Community, Member States, regions and administrative units 
The European Community as a publisher - Extract from our catalogue of publications 
• The brochures for business cannot be obtained on subscription. They are available at the information offices (..., list of addrHSH). EN 
Maintenance  of undistorted  competition  is 
one of the fundamental principles of the free 
market  economy  on  which  the  European 
Community is based. 
The competition rules  which  have  been  es-
tablished in  this context are aimed at ensur-
ing that a healthy competitive environment 
exists  throughout a unified  European mar-
ket,  for  the  benefit  of  all  - producers, 
traders, consumers and the economy in gene-
ral. 
This guide to the competition rules is aimed 
at  making  small  and  medium-sized  enter-
prises more fully  aware of the meaning and 
scope of this area of Community law. Parti-
cular attention is paid to the special possibili-
ties which have been provided in this field for 
cooperation between small and medium-sized 
firms. 
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